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Abstract 
This essay argues that genres as positive entities are fantasies that texts project, and 
proposes to study how such projection occurs. Drawing on Derrida’s account of genre as 
law, it explores how Agamben’s work on genus might extend into poetics. Through content, 
form, and treatment of the philosophical question of the limits of human being, three 
medieval artefacts, each foregrounding Alexander the Great, position themselves relative to 
law, and therefore to genre. By invoking two genres (roman antique and chanson de geste) 
without conforming to either, the Old French Roman d’Alexandre carves out a position at 
once subject to and exempted from the law. Contrastingly, the Middle English Alexander and 
Dindimus claims exemplary obedience to the law as the perfect alliterative debate poem. 
Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodl. 264, treats Alexander and Dindimus as an interpolation 
completing the Roman d’Alexandre, adding a French prose Marco Polo and a program of 
illustrations. Bodl. 264 presents itself as supplementing the law when it overrides textual, 
formal, and linguistic boundaries in the name of Christian expansionism. In each artefact, 
relations to poetic laws interact with political and philosophical stances, inviting different 
audience responses. 
 
KEYWORDS: Roman d’Alexandre, Alexander and Dindimus, manuscript context, Derrida, 
Agamben, law, the open. 
 
In “La Loi du genre,” Jacques Derrida presents the interaction between texts and genres as 
an erotic courtroom drama. Arraigned at the bar of genre (“Exactly what genre are you, text? 
Have you obeyed the rules laid down for that genre?”), texts fantasize about genres, exalting 
them as authorities to be submitted to, seduced, flirted with, defied, perverted, or theatrically 
betrayed. Texts respond to genre’s demands—to be properly genred or to declare their 
genre—at an intimate level, in ways sometimes obvious and direct, sometimes obscure and 
circuitous. Each text will respond in an individual manner to the genres it cathects and 
thereby proclaims as its own laws, and therefore each text will actualize different potential 
facets of those genres, and in different ways. Any single instance of genre is therefore sui 
generis. Genres’ mandates nevertheless extend beyond the particular text, for the very 
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textual responses they evoke empower them as objects of desire and hence authorities for 
other works. Thus, different novels may convey dissimilar impressions of what “the novel” as 
a genre is, without the concept losing coherence.  
 
Whereas Derrida considers genre largely in relation to gender, I wish to focus on a 
different cognate: the biological term genus, as mobilized by Giorgio Agamben in 
The Open: Man and Animal. Agamben claims, “In our culture, the decisive political 
conflict, which governs every other conflict, is that between the animality and the 
humanity of man” (80). The choice of theorist alters the focus as well as the 
rhetorical terms of the analysis. If both Derrida and Agamben are concerned with the 
ethics and politics of legalistic discourses, Derrida treats the primary instance of the 
Law as the incest taboo, whereas Agamben emphasizes the human/animal 
distinction. The former therefore employs an erotic discourse which highlights 
manifold and multiform libidinous relations developed as texts orient themselves 
desiringly towards genres. Agamben’s account of the scientific discourse of genus, in 
contrast, highlights efforts to classify, to establish and allocate stable categories and 
identities, and to police a single boundary. Although his aim is ultimately to suspend 
and then reorient operative political distinctions, Agamben emphasizes how “proper” 
relations to law are encouraged and monitored. I am encouraged by Agamben’s 
practice elsewhere in his philosophical writings of creatively relating politics to 
poetics to explore The Open’s potential as a tool of poetic analysis. I would like, 
however, to keep in mind Derrida’s emphasis on the teasing and creative play that 
occurs when genres and texts encounter each other—aspects less obvious in 
Agamben, with his graver focus on political struggle. 
 
The examination of genre that I undertake here, then, is not a hunt for the fantasy 
bodies that would be identifiable genres, but an exploration of networks of desire, 
divergence, and conformity implied by texts’ form, content, and other attributes. In 
connecting genre to Agamben’s discussion of the political and metaphysical aspects 
of genus, I propose to explore how relationships to boundaries and laws 
(relationships that texts display in various ways including thematic and formal) also 
indicate each text’s self-positioning towards genre. My discussion will focus on the 
Old French verse Roman d’Alexandre and Middle English Alexander and Dindimus, 
and on their manuscript context in the richly decorated Bodleian Library MS Bodl. 
264, “a kind of verbal and visual summa Alexandriana.”1 These artefacts invite 
analysis in Agamben’s terms for they stage repeatedly the questions of the places in 
creation of man in general and of one man in particular—Alexander the Great—and 
of the relations between laws and different kinds of being (genera). Such 
taxonomical matters carry ethical, political, and metaphysical importance in the 
Roman d’Alexandre and Alexander and Dindimus; they are evident also in each 
work’s relations to genre. These relations look different, however, when we analyze 
how Bodl. 264 as a whole expresses codicologically relationships to boundaries and 
rules which are analogous to those which the two literary texts manifest thematically 
and formally. Each artefact reaches across distinctions of varying kinds, invoking 
different laws in order to test them; each considers identifying correct laws and 
customs to be a matter of priority. However, these shared concerns give rise to 
various attitudes towards genre and towards law more broadly.  
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The next section of this essay will lay out briefly Agamben’s concepts of the “open” and the 
“closed,” in order to show how he connects metaphysical reflections on humanity’s 
distinctive, superior nature with scientific classification of animal genera. Agamben’s 
insistence on the political function of scientific and metaphysical discourses is directly 
relevant to the themes of the Roman d’Alexandre and of Alexander and Dindimus, and my 
second and third sections will analyse those works in turn. Finally I shall turn to the reframing 
of the texts in Bodl. 264. If, as I have suggested, any single instance of a genre is sui 
generis, then that is true not only of texts. In medieval literature, genre is also a function of 
individual manuscripts.  
 
The Open and the Closed 
Agamben’s guiding principle in The Open is that “the caesura between the human and the 
animal passes first of all within man” (16). The “animal question” is therefore also, and 
primarily, a human one. Asking “in what way—within man—has man been separated from 
non-man, and the animal from the human” (16) will allow us to critique the bases of human 
inequality. On the one hand, Agamben rejects the toxic ideologies which misuse the “zone of 
indifference” (37) or “of exception” (79) to deny true humanity to some human beings. On the 
other hand, he combats the “biopower” (12) typical of modern societies, which posits us all 
as “anthropophorous animals” (18) and thus encourages bovine complacency and ovine 
conformism. Agamben argues that both of these objectionable developments depend 
significantly on the modern scientific distinction between human and animal, whose 
functioning he therefore sets out to interrogate and to dismantle.2  
 
Heidegger helps him in this task by arguing that human living (Dasein) is not simply 
opposed to animal life as “open” to “closed” (49-77). In Agamben’s use here, the 
Heideggerian concept of “the Open” may be glossed roughly as the existential 
dimension of human life. “Open” human characteristics include free will, self-
determination, discretion, decision-making, self-awareness, and consciousness. 
These, Heidegger argues, meet their absolute limit in mortality and in other human 
beings, and are therefore ultimately “closed,” bound as is animal life to materiality, 
necessity, and finitude. Furthermore, even the most “open” characteristics are less 
autonomous than we like to think. Agamben’s account of Heidegger’s discussion of 
“profound boredom” (63–70) highlights the mundane limitations on human freedom. 
When waiting for a train I should read to pass the time, yet somehow I can’t. 
Imprisoned by boredom, I am “closed”; tedium overrides and mocks my supposed 
ability to transcend my surroundings. At best, therefore, human “openness” for 
Heidegger is “openness to a closedness” (68): the best that we can hope for is an 
ironic awareness of the restrictions set upon our higher capacities by our “animal” 
base. For Heidegger, this is both a chastening of the master of the universe and a 
restatement of human superiority, but Agamben artfully emphasizes its 
consequences for his own project by extending the notion of “closedness.” In his 
account, even within the highest and most “open” of human experiences there are 
aspects which are humbly stimulus-bound, therefore “closed.” These align us with 
the being that we attribute to animals, undermining the human/animal distinction and 
Heidegger’s claims for human elitism. Conversely, a degree of “openness” can be 
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accorded non-humans, including even the humblest of animals (39–47).3 Agamben’s 
contestation prompts us to challenge the powerful political caesuras—the laws—
which regulate the human sphere by distributing access to openness differentially to 
individual and groups. 
 
There are significant points of contact between Agamben’s discussion and the 
medieval texts that I shall discuss. Both the Roman d’Alexandre and Alexander and 
Dindimus take exercise of the higher, properly human faculties to be an ethical (and 
for Alexander and Dindimus, spiritual) good. Each stages encounters between 
humans and other beings, inciting us to classification. Each also proposes 
“openness” as the principal test of humanity, specifically in an “open” relationship to 
law. And each uses the caesura that marks the point of separation-connection 
between human and animal as a way of valuing human beings differently, 
considering that those who accept or reject laws uncritically behave in a bestial 
manner. Both texts incorporate the notion of “openness to closedness” in the willing 
acknowledgement of certain constraints on action, dependent on the consciousness 
seeing beyond and reflecting upon the horizons that those constraints imply. 
Supposed restrictions thereby become evidence of the highest human freedom. For 
both works this “openness to closedness” forms part of a creaturely ethics in which 
the supreme good consists in obedience to God’s plan for the class of being to which 
one belongs. I shall argue, moreover, that in each text this discussion is led at the 
level of genre and form as well as that of theme. 
 
Le Roman d’Alexandre: Human and Animal  
The Old French Vulgate Roman d’Alexandre by Alexandre de Paris (usually dated to around 
1180) relates the spectacular exploits of Alexander the Great from cradle to tomb.4 The work 
places itself at the bar before the two major secular narrative genres of the langue d’oïl 
(Gaullier-Bougassas). Usually discussed alongside the early romances known as romans 
antiques, with which it shares classical setting and several themes, it is nevertheless 
considered peripheral to that group by virtue of its date, milieu, and manuscript context, as 
well as of its form.5 Whereas the other romans antiques employ octosyllabic rhyming 
couplets—the dominant meter of twelfth-century French-language historiography and 
romance – the Roman d’Alexandre is written in laisses: sequences of a variable number of 
lines bound together by a single rhyme or assonance at the line end. Through this form, 
along with warlike themes and formulaic style, the text simultaneously exempts itself from 
the laws of the roman antique, and appeals to the chanson de geste or Old French epic 
genre. Here too, however, the choice of form is out of step, since the usual chanson de 
geste line of the time is decasyllabic while the Roman d’Alexandre is written in 
dodecasyllabics, as are its many later continuations. This is neither the first nor by any 
means the only use of what will in the fifteenth century become known as the alexandrine 
line (Lote, vol. 2, 54–56); nevertheless, one can speculate on the collocation. Like Alexander 
himself, the dodecasyllabic line gives extra measure and surpasses the norm. It commands 
attention, notably by displacing the caesura from its usual position in twelfth-century 
chansons de geste, where it creates hemistichs of different lengths (four plus six syllables, 
occasionally six plus four). In Alexander’s dodecasyllabic line, the caesura falls on the sixth 
syllable, thus equalizing the syllabic count of the hemistichs. The effect on an ear 
accustomed to the decasyllabic arrangement is to make the alexandrine line seem over-long 
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in one hemistich even as it emphasizes the symmetry between the half-lines: a subtly 
troubling effect, which makes the metric pattern seem at once intuitive, innovative, and 
imposed. Lote’s discussion of the caesura, to which I owe this account of its balancing effect, 
demonstrates that the caesura represents not a silence but a suspended note, in which the 
voice lingers over a stressed syllable.6 Falling on, not after, that syllable, the caesura 
suspends as well as introduces difference, and makes its management a living issue for 
performer and audience. Whereas Agamben treats the caesura as synonymous with hiatus 
and linked to the will to separate cleanly, Lote’s account emphasizes the caesura as 
articulating troubling continuities and crossovers. Agamben’s political aims may therefore be 
considered to be in harmony with the poetics of works like the Roman d’Alexandre. 
 
This brief discussion shows how the Roman d’Alexandre manifests “openness” in 
relation to not one but two genres. Claiming to be an exception relative to the laws it 
cathects, the work exemplifies the sui generis aspect of genre. This stance correlates 
to its subject matter: the Roman d’Alexandre is a showcase for its exceptional 
protagonist. Alexander’s appetites for knowledge about the human and natural world 
feed into his heightened diplomatic and strategic awareness, making Alexander the 
greatest of commanders and the best of men. This is a cue for the text to explore at 
length the relations between Alexander and different kinds of beings in ways which 
recall Agamben’s terms of “open” and “closed.”  
Thus the prologue begins by insisting that the reader will learn from this 
account of Alexander’s life: 
De connoistre reison d’amer et de haïr, 
De ses amis garder et chierement tenir, 
Des anemis grever, c’on n’en puisse eslargir, 
Des ledures vengier et des biens fes merir, 
De haster quant leus est et a terme soffrir. (1.3–7)7 
 
To know when it is right to love and when to hate, to look after and cherish 
one’s friends, to harm one’s enemies, as badly as possible, to avenge 
offences and to reciprocate good deeds, to hasten when that is appropriate 
and to bide one’s time. 
 
Although most readers can hardly hope to follow Alexander beyond the “bonnes 
Artu” (1.128; the limits of Arthur [i.e. the limits of the known world]), they can be like 
him by exercising judgement in their everyday interactions with others. The prologue 
gradually establishes this capacity for discretion as one that distinguishes humans 
from animals. Conoistre (to recognize, acknowledge) is repeatedly used to refer to 
knowledge available to human subjects. It is employed both in reference to the 
audience (for example, 1.3, 1.39, and 1.47) and to Alexander himself (1.77). Beasts 
on the other hand are allotted only saveir (to know intellectually or practically): “Les 
bestes en fremirent, quant sorent la menee” (1.88; the beasts quivered when they 
knew the business). In an episode that epitomizes the distinction between the 
“closed” animal and “open” human, griffins, captured by their appetites, will transport 
Alexander in flight, but only he gains cosmic knowledge and expands the field of his 
human understanding (1.73–76 and 3.4949–5098).  
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Alexander establishes his own and humanity’s role as at once masters of the natural 
world and part of it, subject to its laws but “open” to the “closedness” those laws 
impart. To foreground this activity on Alexander’s part, the text presents us with fluid 
categories. The borders between human, animal, vegetable, and mineral are placed 
in question as Alexander repeatedly encounters creatures occupying “zones of 
indifference” between human and other genera: Bucephalus, sirens, flower-women, 
automata, Gog and Magog, to mention only a few. Alexander’s job is to subdue 
these creatures and, in doing so, to judge carefully how to treat them. When he 
descends into the ocean depths in a glass submersible, for example, Alexander 
learns from the marine creatures: “Comment guerre doit estre en bataille establie / 
Aucune fois par force et autre par voisdie, / Car force vaut molt peu s’engiens ne li 
aïe” (3.530–32; how war in battle must be waged sometimes with military might and 
sometimes with trickery, for might is worth little unless assisted by strategy). This 
lesson, carried over into human affairs, will enable him to defeat the Indian king 
Porrus. On the other hand, Alexander condemns another submarine scenario as 
unfit for humans: 
 
Et vit les grans poissons vers les petis mellés; 
Qant li petis est pris sempres est devourés. 
Qant ce vit Alixandres, adont s’est porpensés 
Que tous cis siecles est et peris et dampnés. … 
“Covoitise nos a tous sorpris et vaincus, 
Certes par avarisse est li mons confondus. 
Je vi as grans poissons devorer les menus, 
Ainsi as povres homes est li avoirs tolus.” (3.445–48, 3.508–11) 
 
And he saw the big fish clash with the small; when the small fish is taken, it is 
straightaway devoured. When Alexander saw this, then he thought to himself 
that all this world is lost and damned. … “Covetousness has overcome and 
vanquished us all, certainly, by avarice has the world been ruined. I saw the 
little fish devoured by the great, in the same way are the possessions of the 
poor man snatched away.” 
 
Comparing human and piscine behavior, Alexander draws out each’s ethical and 
political valences. Because Porrus’s kingly practice resembles that of the big fish, he 
will lose the war; his small fry will desert him. As Alexander asks the defeated 
monarch on seeing the latter’s accumulated treasure, “Qui rien ne veut doner quels 
homes cuide avoir? / Cil ou il mieus se fie le met en nonchaloir” (3.2213–14; if 
someone is not willing to give away anything, what kind of men does he expect to 
have? The one in whom he most trusts cares nothing for him). Alexander, wiser than 
fish or king, gives liberally, ensuring loyal service. Thus the continuum drawn by the 
Roman d’Alexandre across human and non-human behaviors serves to establish the 
ideal human character: the one who can place caesuras appropriately despite that 
continuum. This ability defines human sovereignty over other beings, and identifies 
the actual sovereign as its best practitioner. 
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However, Alexander is not merely “open” on humanity’s behalf; he exemplifies 
Heidegger’s notion of “openness to closedness.” Even such achievements as his are 
limited by mortality, as he himself turns out to be the one “maniere de char” (1.89; 
kind of flesh) that he cannot overcome: “sa belle char fu morte et enterree” (1.133; 
his fair flesh was dead and buried). Warned that he is soon to die, he refuses to turn 
aside from his goal “por paor de mort” (3.3874; for fear of death). He carries 
“openness to closedness” to a heroic level. Alexander marches with eyes open 
towards death, the final limitation that he simultaneously recognizes and defies. 
When he does so, Alexander both acknowledges and exceeds the anthropophorous 
animal that is the human substrate. Here as elsewhere, Alexander’s incomparable 
performance dignifies the human genus. 
 
The same limited “openness” means that the Roman d’Alexandre does not chart a 
simple triumphal progression. Alexander always challenges constraints (the 
characteristic word is “esprover”; to test, prove), but with varying outcomes. 
Sometimes he abolishes a restriction, as with the dismantling of the automata 
guarding the flower-women’s forest (3.3388–456). Sometimes he bows to constraint, 
as when he accepts that the flower-women cannot survive outside their forest 
(3.3521–44); the limitation is again mortality.8 But other cases are more complex. 
Trapped with his men in the inescapable Val périlleux, Alexander reads an inscription 
which unexpectedly sets them free; however, the audience remains in the dark and 
the valley remains fatal (3.2876–78). Alexander here transcends the common law but 
upholds its general validity, his exception proving the rule. 
 
This leads me to a different understanding of the “zones of indifference” within the 
Roman d’Alexandre. Turning from the caesura between human and animal we may, 
following Agamben’s advice, focus instead on caesuras as stress points within 
humanity. The poem’s opening lines, quoted above, tell us that some are friends, 
some enemies. More subtly, these lines distinguish between those who know how to 
tell friends from enemies and to act accordingly, and those who do not. Discernment 
may be a properly human faculty, but it is not universally shared. Poor narrators and 
“cil trouveour bastart” (1.37; these bastard poets) lack it and therefore “resamble[nt] 
l’asnon en son versefïer” (1.34; resemble the ass in its versifying). The final 
refinement of discernment is to know the extent of our own “closedness”: the laws 
that properly bind us. To achieve this is both our duty and our reward as readers. 
And an important test of our understanding, according to the Roman d’Alexandre, is 
whether we accept our place within the political order.  
 
Alexander himself makes this point when reproached by his barons for the “grans 
desverie” (3.524; great insanity) of his submarine escapade. Kings, say the barons, 
should remember that the well-being of their people hangs on their personal safety. 
Alexander’s reply to the barons finely mixes philosophical generality with political 
specificity, and the natural with the human world: 
 
“Dans Clins,” ce dist li rois, “bien fait a otroier, 
Mais li rois est molt fols et peu fait a proisier 
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Qui toutes ses besoignes fera par conseillier –  
Puis qu’il a tant de sens, qu’il se sache targier – 
Et a autrui s’atent; bien le puis afichier 
Que il n’est mie rois ne ne vaut un denier, 
Ains est espoëntaus q’on seut en champ drecier 
Qant li vilains en veut les oisiaus manecier, 
Il ne set ne ne puet ne traire ne lancier.” (3.549–57) 
 
“Lord Clin,” said the king, “that I grant you, but the king is very foolish and 
little worthy of praise who does all his tasks by counsel – if he has enough 
sense, let him look after himself – and who waits on others; I can well declare 
that he is no king, and not worth a penny, no: he is a scarecrow of the sort 
that’s put up in the field when the peasant wants to threaten the birds with it, 
he [/it] neither knows how nor is able to draw bow or wield lance.” 
 
For the common good, royalty requires a greater degree of freedom in the exercise 
of its discretion than do those of lesser station. In Alexander’s case, then, 
transgressing laws is part of the same process as law-giving. Along with generalship, 
it is in relation to law that it is most appropriate and crucial that a king exercise his 
discernment freely, untrammelled by common norms. On the other hand, because 
the text emphasizes the discernment that he uses to assess and correct existing 
laws and to instate new ones, the royal relation to law is presented as largely on a 
continuum with that available to lowlier mortals. Everyone, including Alexander, is a 
subject of the law. 
 
The lowest category of human being in the Roman d’Alexandre is accordingly represented 
by those who refuse to recognize their place, the “serfs” against whom the text rails. “Serfs” 
are presented as uniquely “closed” within a nature incapable of gratitude, loyalty or respect: 
animal in their degree of determination. In such figures as Alexander’s murderers, Antipater 
and Divinuspater, humanity’s internal caesuras harden into rigid divisions, disrupting the 
continuum through which the text generously offers its readers the chance to identify with 
Alexander (so long as they acknowledge the social difference). Agamben has written 
elsewhere (Homo sacer) about the logic of the exception as underpinning the sovereign 
authority to make or suspend laws, a capacity that aligns kings with the indifferently human. 
Thus the “serfs,” through social mobility, mirror Alexander in audaciously challenging 
boundaries. What the text portrays as their exceptional “closedness” mirrors and enhances 
Alexander’s exceptional “openness,” as well as explaining his fall. 
 
Thus the Roman d’Alexandre establishes the ideally human as both subject and exception 
relative to the law. Audience members are invited to be “open” to their own “closedness,” 
freely and consciously adopting their proper position in an order that stretches from 
questions of human and non-human being, to distinctions of social rank. Overstepping 
proper boundaries is represented as either an imperial or a slavish activity. The text allies 
itself with the elite variant through the way it positions itself relative to two genres. Partially 
both roman antique and chanson de geste, fully neither, it is doubly, asymmetrically 
extraordinary. Like its protagonist, it claims the privilege of exploring new territories and of 
challenging existing laws. Like him, it establishes itself as one of a kind; if we can speak of 
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an “Alexandrine” genre here, it lies in this haughty, paradoxical refusal to conform to 
prototypes (Braudy).  
 
Alexander and Dindimus: Human and Divine  
Alexander and Dindimus is considered to be a romance, and often presented as a fragment 
of a lost, longer Alexander romance. However, “Middle English romance” is a nebulous 
category which leaves uncertain what laws may be invoked, or how, and which overlaps with 
other generic groupings. The poem’s form complicates the question further: written in 
unrhymed alliterative long lines, it is considered an early work of the disputed “Alliterative 
Revival” of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries.9 Some critics consider that 
alliterative form does not significantly affect genre, others that it does, while a third group 
represents alliterative works as effectively constituting a genre in their own right. As a group, 
the works share many themes with roman antique or chanson de geste, among them 
learning, Latinity, translatio, history, and warfare. I shall argue that Alexander and Dindimus 
uses alliterative form to invoke a set of laws and to establish a relation to them. In this sense, 
the form implies generic specificity.  
 
Some of the best works of Middle English literature are written in alliterative verse, 
whose metrics have attracted excellent scholarly discussion. Its conspicuous 
alliterating syllables and strong stress patterns give long-line, unrhymed alliterative 
verse an impression of densely focused tight-knittedness: “with lel letteres loken” (Sir 
Gawain and the Green Knight 35). It is surprising, therefore, that scholars still cannot 
pinpoint its versification to their satisfaction. It is accepted that the alliterative long 
line usually has four stresses, two in the first hemistich, two in the second; the 
hemistichs are bridged by alliterating syllables in the pattern aa/ax, where a is the 
alliterating sound and x a non-alliterating one. The stress patterns of the half-lines 
must differ, and certain rules of stress distribution have been established. 
Nevertheless, it is not always clear where in any given line these stresses lie, and 
critics struggle to find an account which does not leave many lines irregular or 
corrupt. Near misses and false starts or endings complicate the design. And although 
it is a critical element in the metrics, notably in distinguishing alliterative verse from 
prose, the position of the caesura in practice often remains uncertain. In my view, 
such resistance to the expertise of both medieval and modern readers bears witness 
to the form’s open-endedness, which I propose to treat as a positive feature. The 
alliterative long line itself raises questions of intention and accident, of pattern and 
predictability and (drawing on Agamben) of regularity and conformity in their political 
and legal senses. Reading or listening to these texts, we must be alert to identify the 
alliterating design while accepting that some lines never fulfil expectations. Insofar as 
it embodies a will and a plan felt but not fully apprehended, alliterative verse shades 
easily into uncertainty and thence into enigma.  
 
It is interesting, then, that Alexander and Dindimus should be so regular: “the single 
most accurate guide to the metrical practices of an alliterative poet” (Putter, 
Jefferson, and Stokes 47–48).10 Alexander and Dindimus relates to the formal law it 
invokes in the mode of exemplarity, promoting an ideal of conformity the rules of 
which, however, remain obscure. It endows those rules with substance, authority and 
desirability by the way that it evokes them, performatively creating “a paradigmatic 
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alliterative poem, an almost perfect example of the species” (Grady 82). This could 
be explained in terms of literary history: Alexander and Dindimus as an early work of 
the Revival might represent a purity from which later efforts degraded. Alternatively, 
this “almost perfect” poem may be a fantasy object of our curiosity, which the text 
both arouses and baffles. Alexander and Dindimus thus presents itself as an 
exemplary expression of a singular law, a law which we are induced to desire 
especially because it remains mysterious. Contrast to this the way in which the 
Roman d’Alexandre invokes two genres both in the mode of exception, constantly 
calling us to measure how far and in what ways the text departs from expectations 
that it itself establishes even as it distances itself from them. 
 
This positioning relative to the law of genre both supports and is glossed by the 
debate within Alexander and Dindimus, whose theme is how best to accomplish 
God’s will. By comparison with both the Roman d’Alexandre and Agamben’s essay, 
Alexander and Dindimus displaces the caesura which marks humanity’s relationship 
with its significant other, who is not animal but divine. Alexander and Dindimus agree 
that he who rejects God’s plan for mankind is worse than an animal; being “closed” 
to that transcendence to which a human ought, uniquely, to be “open,” his degraded 
condition may be described as “bestial” or “brutish.” Thus in my view, the relationship 
drawn between humans and animals in this text is primarily a rhetorical trope, used 
to gauge the proper relationship between humans and God.  
 
In his first letter describing the Brahmins’ life and ethos, their king Dindimus, “þe 
doctour of wise” (249; wise teacher), explains that they approach God by embracing 
the condition of the human animal, what Agamben calls “bare life” (76). Their 
asceticism enables them to master the internal enemy that is temptation, liberating 
them from either fear of or desire for externals, which in turn permits them to focus 
on God (337–62). Dindimus insists that the Brahmins lead a life comparable to the 
Golden Age (Steel). It is simple, but not deprived: “We han so michel at þe mel þat 
we no more wilne” (304; we have so much at the meal that we want no more). Free 
from lack, they have no reason to commit crimes (369–97). Their rightful and 
reasonable habits ensure the maximum possible lifespan: “Forþei ne se we no seg 
sodainly deie; / For we ne liȝthe noht our lif wiþ no luþur dede, / Wherefore we 
scholde with schame be schorted of daies” (399–401; therefore we see no one die 
suddenly, for we do not shorten our life with any hateful deed because of which we 
ought in shame to be deprived of days). As Dindimus presents it, this is not a 
rejection of the flesh but a fulfilment of its potential on the path to divinely ordained 
humanity. Thus, although the Brahmins disdain most human crafts as vanity (for 
instance agriculture, beautiful clothing, philosophy, or washing, 402ff.), they do not 
scorn the dew that cleanses them (425), wise words (461–62), nor reading historical 
romances (467–68). Their voluntary self-restriction is properly seen as “openness to 
closedness,” of great spiritual and ethical worth. In the example of the Brahmins, the 
anthropophorous animal occupies a zone of indistinction not only between man and 
animal, but also, and precisely for that reason, between man and God. In Dindimus’s 
account, this zone is that of exemplary subjection to God’s law. 
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Alexander’s retort (822–966) to this lengthy account contains a slew of animal 
similes supporting this contention:  
 
Þanne hit semeþ by ȝoure sawe, ȝif ȝe soþ tellen, 
Þat kindely ȝoure consience acordeþ to bestus; 
For as bestes ȝe ben by no skile reuled, – 
Ne hem of kinde no comeþ no konninge of witte, – 
So be ȝe, ludus, bylad and laweles alse 
Þat han no reward to riht but redlese wirchen. 
But we faiþful folk, þat faren as wise, 
Ben ydemed to do dedus of rihte. 
Forþy us kenneþ our kinde to acorde in trowþe, 
In swiche lawus to live þat longen to Gode, 
For to sowe and to sette in þe sad erthe 
And oþur wordliche werk wisly to founde. (902–13) 
 
Then it appears, from what you say, if you speak truly, that your hearts are 
like those of beasts in nature, for like beasts, you are ruled by no discretion – 
no intelligent understanding is natural to them – just so are you, people, 
misled and lawless at the same time, who have no regard for right but behave 
foolishly. But we, faithful folk, who behave wisely, are appointed to perform 
great deeds as by right. Therefore our nature teaches us to live together 
faithfully, to live in God’s laws, to sow and to plant in the firm earth, and to 
practice other earthly works wisely. 
 
The Brahmins are bestial and lawless; the genuinely law-biding path is that taken by 
Alexander’s people in their response to natural resources and opportunities. The 
parable of the talents comes to mind, although it is not mentioned (Alexander’s 
discourse remains aristocratic, leaving the clerical register to Dindimus). Refusing to 
fish, trap birds, cultivate crops, wear fine clothes or sail ships, the Brahmins 
perversely reject God’s gifts: “Þanne schewe ȝe to hur Schappere schame for His 
sondus” (959; then you treat your Maker’s ordinances contemptuously). In the habits 
that Dindimus exalts as virtuously chosen austerity and pious acceptance of divinely 
imposed constraints, Alexander sees only bestial compulsion, the result of a 
restricted diet, likening the Brahmins to starving wolves (858–69). The Brahmins are 
“closed” where they should be “open.” This is not holiness but “folie” (966; folly). 
Alexander rejects both Dindimus’s advocacy of “mekenesse” (614; humility, 
obedience, patience) as the chief virtue and his interpretation of Alexander’s 
expansionism and inquisitiveness as “covaitise” (257; covetousness), driven by need 
and greed (a particular insult given that Alexander’s defining quality is largesse). He 
advances the variety of beings and of being that he has seen on his travels, 
alongside more familiar variations such as youth and age, to argue that true 
reverence lies in fulfilling the potential given variably to different creatures by God 
and by kinde. Alexander denies that his own conquests and boundary-crossings trap 
him in earthly “closedness”; on the contrary, his daring epitomizes the path to true 
humanity, and therefore exemplifies obedience to God’s will. 
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Thus the two kings agree on the goal of exemplary submission to God’s law, but 
differ on how to attain it. Mirroring this, their debate turns on puns whose meaning 
and value are disputed. Dindimus expatiates on the “fals godus” (603; false gods) 
that the Greeks “Wilfully worschipen wiþ wordliche godus” (604; worship obstinately 
with worldly goods). The pun on gods/goods is extended, with the pagan pantheon 
translating into consecration of body-parts and appetites. Devotion to Bacchus, 
patron of the throat, corresponds to desire for wine, held to be a good (675–78). The 
Brahmin king asserts that such gods and goods “han miht upon molde and of no mo 
þingus” (739; have power on earth but over nothing else). Therefore, when he 
introduces himself as the son whom the “grete god Amon … / Bigat on Olimpias þe 
onurable queen” (193–94; great god Ammon begot on Olympias, the honorable 
queen), Alexander plays into Dindimus’s hands: according to the latter, Alexander is 
imprisoned in materiality precisely where he targets transcendence. Dindimus’s own 
people, in contrast, worship not “wordliche godus” but “Godus worþliche Word” (615; 
God’s worthy Word), a Christian-sounding “Sone soþliche of Man þat in Himsilf 
dwelleþ” (616; Son truly of Man, who dwells in Himself). Dindimus’s rhetoric implies 
intuitively obvious superiority, however Alexander is not prepared to concede the 
point, and elaborates effectively on his former arguments: he pursues worldly goods 
because they are God’s, not gods. The idea that God is immanent in the created 
world, and therefore in humans, allows both of the contrary arguments that Dindimus 
and Alexander advance. For each, the other attends to “this world” in such a way as 
to miss “the Word” in it; each claims correct reconciliation between Word and world 
in his own people’s practice and attacks the other’s lack of fit. 
 
The crucial question concerns “þe lif þat come schal heraftur, / And derely wiþoute 
deþ dure schal evere” (363–64; the life to come hereafter, which will indeed last 
forever, beyond death). The debaters differ over what earthly actions will best 
achieve this greatest, metaphysical boundary-crossing. Alexander’s condemnation of 
the Brahmins’ willful philosophical and physical isolation recalls the prisoners of 
Plato’s cave: “Ȝe arn liche of ȝour lif to swiche loþe burnus / Þat ben in dep presoun 
don al hure daies time / And han mirþus on molde missed ful clene” (1097–99; in 
your way of life you are like wretches who have been thrown into a deep prison for 
their whole lives and have completely lacked joy on earth). Who best serves God 
exploits his creation; damnation awaits the blinkered Brahmins (1106–9). For his 
part, Dindimus warns especially against the attempt to usurp divine status, 
associating Alexander with those who reject the “closedness” of mortality—a mistake 
that will, of course, end in the final closure of damnation (1060–71). 
 
As the text stands, the debate remains open. The relative equality between 
Alexander and Dindimus is evident when compared with Alexander’s earlier 
encounter with the Gymnosophists. Superficially similar to the Brahmins, they 
present vanitas arguments to justify their ascetic way of life. When Alexander offers 
them a reward in return for their story, they ask for “Ai-lastinge lif” (70; life 
everlasting), and when he declares that he cannot give, they ask: 
 
[S]yn þou so knowist 
Þat þe is demed þe deþ to dure nouht longe, 
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Whi farest þou so fihtinge folk to distroie, 
And for to winne þe word wendest so romme? (77–80)  
 
Since you know that you are condemned to die and not to live long, why do 
you go around fighting to destroy people, and travel so widely to gain the 
world? 
 
Although this question uses contemptus mundi rhetoric, the Gymnosophists stop 
short of making the connection to God’s will. Their question only opens up the space 
for Alexander to claim the spiritual high ground:  
 
Þorou þe grace of God I gete þat I have. 
Þei han demed me or deþ, þorou dintus of miȝhte 
Of erþe to be emperour in everych a saide. 
Sin I have grace of þat graunt grimmest to worþe, 
I wrouthe wrecheli now and wraþede Drihten, 
Ȝif I for dul of any deþ my destené fledde 
Þat is markid to me and to no mo kingus. (84–90) 
 
I achieve what I have through God’s grace. They have ordained me before I die, 
through mighty blows, to be emperor of the whole earth. Since I have permission by 
that grace to be most tempestuous, I would do basely now and anger the Lord if I for 
fear of any death fled my destiny which is assigned to me and to no other kings. 
Alexander compares his characteristic restlessness and haste (“cof” and “raþe”) to 
the waves on the sea, equally moved by the breath of heaven (91–100). Compared 
to this grand vision of providence acting through the gifts of one man, the 
Gymnosophists’ philosophy remains on the worldly side, exposing poverty of spirit 
rather than pious humility.11 To be “open” to the “closedness” of this world, as the 
Gymnosophists are, does not guarantee the vision beyond this world to the next. In 
contrast, Alexander and Dindimus agree that it is this vision that defines the properly 
human.  
 
I do not wish to oversimplify: to live like a beast in Alexander and Dindimus is not to 
live as an animal does. Even the Gymnosophists, most limited of the peoples 
presented, are clearly on the human side of the animal/human borderline. Their 
elaborate, glossed name indicates culture (11–12). If, as Agamben indicates, that 
borderline is a primary instance of the law, then the law rules all the peoples 
portrayed in Alexander and Dindimus. Whereas in the Roman d’Alexandre 
boundaries become frontiers, making the text about the judicious testing, recognition, 
reform, and creation of laws, Alexander and Dindimus focuses on law-keeping; the 
question is not what the law is, or whether it should be obeyed, but how best to obey 
it. Living like a beast is the tragic result of answering this question wrongly. 
 
In both the content and form of Alexander and Dindimus, then, an overarching, 
divinely authorized law is posited, though its details remain obscure and elusive even 
while the desire to conform is clearly defined. Although spiritual error becomes an 
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urgent concern, the relation between God and humanity has its political counterpart. 
Whereas in the Roman d’Alexandre the king’s legitimacy rested on his ability to 
adapt law to any situation, in Alexander and Dindimus it relies on his ability to 
present himself as correctly interpreting and obeying a divine power-source all the 
more intransigent because unknowable. Flora and fauna, and creatures lying 
between those categories and humanity, are in the Roman d’Alexandre exemplary 
subjects of royal law, crying out for regulation and classification as do the varied 
classes of human beings within the poem. In Alexander and Dindimus, non-human 
creatures are available as figures of speech precisely because they are merely 
brutish stage properties in creation’s drama, whose only actors are humans and 
God. While on the one hand, Alexander and Dindimus buttresses the boundary 
separating humans from other beings, on the other, it flattens the potential 
distinctions between humans. It presents a universalist argument: one law will apply 
to all human subjects, kings included. Such a law can only be divine in origin and 
inscrutable in nature, a law to be desired, felt anxiously in our bones, but not to be 
mastered intellectually.  
 
Precisely because of this universalism, however, Alexander and Dindimus opens up 
a zone of exception within the law itself: the law has no need to explain itself; indeed, 
its prerogative correlates to its opacity. The poem stakes its own claim to 
exceptionality in its close relation to that law, being idiosyncratic in its consummate 
submission. The emphasis on exemplary reproduction of an ideal model is mimicked 
in the way alliteration is taken to extremes in the polemical use of puns. Alexander 
and Dindimus adheres so scrupulously to the alliterative law that it looks like 
someone’s fantasy of obedience, and this destabilizes the law itself. The Roman 
d’Alexandre, in contrast, places itself at once within and without two genre laws, 
insisting doubly, even reflexively that in order to give and enforce laws successfully, 
one must be exempted from them. It encourages us to interrogate the different 
systems, to ask whether in particular circumstances one law may seem better fitted 
than the other. Rather than implying complete answers to these questions, the 
Roman d’Alexandre emphasizes the critical faculty to know, analyze and negotiate 
multiple systems. The desire that the Roman d’Alexandre incites in us towards law is 
marked more by curiosity than by anxiety. 
 
MS Bodl. 264: Genus and Genre  
Having discussed each poem individually, in this final section I consider the effects of their 
presentation together in Bodl. 264. Since any concrete instance of genre is sui generis, the 
manuscript contributes as much as the literary text proper does to the cathected authority of 
genre. The manuscript does so through such textual factors as the combination of works 
included and the versions of those texts, their language and form, and through paratextual 
features like illustrations, rubrics, and titles, materials, and craftsmanship. I have argued that 
although both the Roman d’Alexandre and Alexander and Dindimus claim “openness to 
closedness” in support of their particular relation to genre law, the former uses this strategy 
to position itself as a partial, privileged exception to that law, the latter as an (exceptional) 
exemplification of it. Here I shall address the question of how their instance in Bodl. 264 
changes those positions.  
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We can begin with the description on the Bodleian Library website: 
 
(fols. 3r–208r) The Romance of Alexander in French verse, with miniatures 
illustrating legends of Alexander the Great and with marginal scenes of 
everyday life, by the Flemish illuminator Jehan de Grise and his workshop, 
1338–44; with two sections added in England c. 1400, (fols. 209r–215v, with 
fol. 1r) Alexander and Dindimus (Alexander Fragment B) in Middle English 
verse, with coarser miniatures, and (fols. 218r–71v, with fol. 2v) Marco Polo, 
Li Livres du Graunt Caam, in French prose, with miniatures by Johannes and 
his school.12   
 
Thus the manuscript’s production has three phases. An Alexander manuscript 
manufactured on the continent (probably in Tournai; Cruse 61–102) evidently 
travelled to England where it acquired two further texts and two significantly placed 
miniatures: the artist who illustrated Alexander and Dindimus supplied a miniature 
introducing the manuscript as a whole, while Johannes both illustrated Marco Polo’s 
travels and contributed a miniature introducing the French Alexander. The rubrics of 
the first phase were also probably completed in England.  
 
These additions produce a volume whose “physical appearance is intended to flow 
uninterruptedly across the differing origins of the book’s parts” (Dutschke 294), 
urging us to treat it as a new whole. At the top of a blank column on fol. 67r, the hand 
that later copied Alexander and Dindimus has written:13 
 
Here fayleth a prossesse of þis rommauce of alixaud’ þe wheche prossesse 
þat fayleth ȝe schulle fynde at þe ende of þis bok ywrete in engelyche ryme 
and whan ȝe han radde it to þe ende torneþ hedur aȝen and turneþ ouyr þys 
lef and bygynneþ at þys reson Che fu el mois de may que li tans renouele 
and so rede forþ þe rommauce to þe ende whylis þe frenche lasteþ 
 
The rubricator’s instructions imply that we are to view the textual fabric of the 
expanded Alexander narrative as seamless, and the beginning (fol. 209r) and ending 
(fol. 215v) of Alexander and Dindimus are marked only by brief rubrics, not the grand 
miniatures that elsewhere in the manuscript mark major textual divisions.14 The 
English poem is therefore treated like the French Alexander texts here incorporated 
into the Roman d’Alexandre: La Prise de Dafur (fols. 102r–109v and 182v–185r), Les 
Voeux du paon (fols. 110r–163v), Le Restor du paon (fols. 165r–182v), Le Voyage au 
paradis terrestre (fols. 185r–188r) and La Venjance Alixandre (fols. 197r–208r).15 That 
this is a typical presentation of medieval French Alexander material does not 
diminish the importance of the additions or the urge to include them. The extant 
manuscript substantially reorients the meanings and generic positioning of the earlier 
manuscript and of the texts it contains. I have space here to indicate only some of 
the complex effects.  
 
The inscription insists that Alexander and Dindimus is an omission from a section of 
the Roman d’Alexandre in which Alexander seeks and fails to achieve immortality 
and where his forthcoming death is announced. Adding Alexander and Dindimus 
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implies that the manuscript’s earlier Alexander material “fayleth” to give a correct 
account of the relationship between human and God. Dindimus’s rebuke applies also 
to the hero, ethos, and politics of the Roman d’Alexandre; this extension of his 
authority lends weight to his arguments in Alexander and Dindimus, perhaps tipping 
the debate in his favor. However, the consequences are not straightforward. 
Because Alexander and Dindimus contributes a relatively heavyweight intellectual 
debate to the manuscript’s Alexander compilation, it enhances our reading of 
Alexandre de Paris’s text as a roman antique.16 Strengthening the elements of 
clergie, curiosity, and learning increases the earlier compilation’s prestige, with the 
consequence that the vast repertoire of wonders in the Roman d’Alexandre actually 
supports the argument (advanced by the Alexander of Alexander and Dindimus) that 
travel broadens the mind, while the earlier work’s extensive, sympathetic account of 
its hero as a scholar-prince lends substance to a figure only sketched in the later 
poem. Thus interpolation into the Roman d’Alexandre strengthens both sides of the 
debate that animates Alexander and Dindimus.  
 
By the same token, its manuscript context turns the law-abiding Alexander and Dindimus 
into an exception. It is the sole English work in Bodl. 264, notably different by language, 
meter, form, and tradition from either the French-language Alexander compilation or Marco 
Polo’s prose Livres du Graunt Caam (a work better known as, variously, Le Devisement du 
Monde, Travels, or Il Milione). Bodl. 264 presents the alliterative long line as an alternative 
and equivalent to the twelve-syllable, monorhymed laisse which dominates the first 208 
folios. By implying an audience competent in both languages and forms, the manuscript 
carries us effortlessly across the boundaries it displays. It thereby claims for the alliterative 
work the same exceptionality, imperiousness, expansiveness, and refusal to leave limits 
unchallenged that the Roman d’Alexandre makes for itself, and which Alexander and 
Dindimus eschews in its stress on obedience and the observation of limits.17 Bodl. 264 
ensures that alliterative form and English expression cannot be accused of the same 
insularity for which Alexander reproaches Dindimus; they are “open” to the wider world.  
 
There is yet another layer to Bodl. 264. In the Roman d’Alexandre, Alexander is 
presented as God’s instrument; in Alexander and Dindimus, he declares himself to 
be God’s own tempest (91-100). The miniatures added to the manuscript in England, 
however, remind us that he was a pagan. The manuscript’s frontispiece depicts 
Nectanabus in his palace, referring to the tale that Alexander’s true father was the 
necromancer and exiled king of Egypt. This slur is further highlighted by the 
frontispiece added to the Roman d’Alexandre, which shows Olympias, Alexander’s 
mother, in bed with Nectanabus in the form of a dragon, whom she mistakes for the 
god Ammon. In the earliest phase of Bodl. 264, animals and hybrids proliferated in 
the margins of the Roman d’Alexandre, challenging us to mimic Alexander in 
investigating and categorizing them appropriately. In the reworking, they invade the 
central space and become an easily legible moralizing metaphor: Olympias is a fool, 
Nectanabus a knave. Alexander’s boast of divine descent, a feature of the English 
poem, is deflated by the illustrators who decorated that poem and the Marco Polo 
text. On the other hand, the pictures of Dindimus remind us that he too is a pagan, 
his nudity echoing that of the idol pictured on fol. 213r, rubric: “How he telleþ 
alixandre of his maumeutrie” (the text makes it clear that “his” refers to Alexander, 
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but picture and rubric are ambiguous). Thus, the later phases of Bodl. 264 construe 
both Alexander and Dindimus as no better than the Gymnosophists: “closed” to the 
divine exactly where each thinks that he is “open” to it. For all their aspirations, they 
are in the end misled and bestial.  
 
This interpretation of the Alexander material in Bodl. 264 is reinforced by the 
inclusion of the Marco Polo text in French prose. This adds another genre and form 
to the manuscript, and mercantile aspirations to Alexander’s global vision, but there 
is more. Bodl. 264’s Livres du Graunt Caam is copied from another manuscript, 
London, British Library, Royal 19.D.I, which is often considered to be a crusading 
compilation produced in Paris for Philip VI in the 1330s but which was no doubt in 
England by the time it served as a model for Bodl. 264.18 Simon Gaunt argues that 
this, the French redaction of the text, has “far greater pro-Christian and anti-Islamic 
force” (Marco Polo 140) than does the Franco-Italian redaction, and that “an albeit 
unsuccessful attempt is made to foreclose other idioms and exclude differences of a 
variety of kinds, not just linguistic or cultural but also … ambivalent narrative 
techniques” (Marco Polo 111). Royal 19.D.I also contains the Old French prose 
Alexander, which includes the story of Nectanabus’s paternity introduced into the 
later phase of Bodl. 264; it has been argued that the Nectanabus frontispiece is 
imitated from fol. 1r (Dutschke 295). The Christian reorientation supplied by Bodl. 
264 therefore also creates a relationship with another prestigious, specifically royal, 
continental manuscript.19  
 
Thus the manuscript alters not only how we interpret the texts it contains but also 
their relation to the genre law they invoke, which in turn challenges both law and 
genre. Bodl. 264’s emphasis on confessional difference as the most important 
instance of law and criterion of classification positions the expanded Roman 
d’Alexandre (including Alexander and Dindimus) differently relative to the roman 
antique, highlighting how the prowess that genre sponsors “comes to nought 
because it is not predicated on any sort of transcendence” (Baumgartner “Raid” 34). 
The same reorientation also reinforces associations with the chanson de geste, but 
now reminds us how that genre repeatedly stages military encounters between 
Christian and “pagan.” In each case, a late medieval aristocratic audience is 
encouraged to see an injunction to be properly Christian implied in the genres 
encountered when reading the Roman d’Alexandre. If crusade is invoked here, it 
may be both a real possibility and a useful trope for the assertion of authority closer 
to home. By interpolating Alexander and Dindimus into the French-language 
Alexander tradition, Bodl. 264 affirms the outward orientation and global reach of 
alliterative verse. It not only translates culturally diverse material into a sophisticated 
English poetic form, but also commands cosmopolitan and politically astute 
audiences across and beyond English lands. Bodl. 264 exploits and inflects the 
genres that it contains. A significant element in its coherence and productivity as an 
artefact is the exceptionalism that the manuscript and the texts it contains enact 
relative to genre law. A ruler who could overstep boundaries and laws in the name of 
imposing more “human” (because more rationally and spiritually justified) ones while 
preserving his sovereign independence of the established Church and of his peers 
would be skillful indeed. He might claim to have achieved the “openness to 
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closedness” which, as in Heidegger, seems in these artefacts to constitute 
humanity’s highest achievement.  
 
                                                     
For discussions about Agamben, I am grateful to Emma Campbell and Petya Ivanova; for 
assistance on French and English poetic form respectively, to Philip Bennett and Ad Putter. 
This essay has also benefited significantly from the input of my colleagues on the AHRC-
funded project, Medieval Francophone Literary Culture Outside France.  
1 Busby, in his indispensable Codex and Context, 1.308.  
2 For Calarco, Agamben’s argument is “essentially political and, in the last analysis, 
anthropocentric” (142; and see 79-102). 
3 Agamben develops Uexküll’s discussion of the tick (Uexküll 44-53).  
4 Baumgartner’s “Formation” is an introductory essay on the French Alexander tradition and 
on the Roman d’Alexandre which touches on many points I shall discuss here. An English-
language overview of the tradition is Harf-Lancner, “Alexander Romances.” Also useful is 
The Medieval Alexander Project website. 
5 For instance, Blumenfeld-Kosinski’s classic study virtually omits the work, but Baswell’s 
essay gives it pride of place alongside a contemporary Alexander life, Thomas of Kent’s 
Roman de Toute Chevalerie. See also Gosman 1-24.  
6 Caesura and rhyme in Latin and French medieval verse occupy much of Lote’s first volume. 
For the elements on which I focus, see especially 167-77. 
7 I quote Alexandre de Paris’s Roman d’Alexandre from The Medieval French “Roman 
d’Alexandre,” ed. Armstrong et al., vol. 2, cited by branch and line number. All translations 
are my own. 
8 On Alexander’s limitations in this episode, see McCracken; Baumgartner, “Formation.” 
9 The Database of Middle English Romance gives the date of composition as 1350. Hanna’s 
essay is an excellent introduction. 
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10 The poem’s few irregularities are detailed by Magoun in the introduction to his edition (96-
100). 
11 It is perhaps relevant that it is only women and children who speak for the Gymnosophists 
here; the men are hiding in caves. This is one of many points where one might interrogate the 
notion of genus relative to gender. 
12 http://image.ox.ac.uk/show?collection=bodleian&manuscript=msbodl264.  
13 The hand often does not distinguish between u and n. I have transcribed from the 
Bodleian’s online reproduction. On the language of the note, see Grady 83-84, n. 3. 
14 For detailed discussion of the manuscript, see especially Busby, Codex and Context 1.307-
15, in his wider discussion of the manuscript contexts of the Roman d’Alexandre, 1.278-328. 
Cruse’s recent, valuable monograph on Bodl. 264 has only a short section on the English 
phase (194-98).  
15 I take the folio ranges from the database to be published in 2014 as part of the AHRC-
funded Medieval Francophone Literary Culture Outside France project. The database 
integrates codicological and textual information for a number of medieval French textual 
traditions, among them the Roman d’Alexandre.  
16 Grady argues that alliterative verse has a particular affiliation with debate, at least after 
Piers Plowman. See also Cartlidge on debate poetry generally, and Otter on Alexander’s 
place in philosophical dialogues. 
17 I agree with those critics for whom alliterative verse evokes multilingual contexts: Latin, 
French, and Greek. See especially the writings of Elizabeth Salter, for instance “Alliterative 
Verse,” and recently Schiff.  
18 The detailed record is: 
http://www.bl.uk/catalogues/illuminatedmanuscripts/record.asp?MSID=8467. 
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19 Much more could be said here than I have space to explore. Gaunt offers a different 
reading of the Alexander tradition; see his comments on the tension between text and 
illustration in Bodl. 264 and Royal 19.D.1 (Marco Polo 120-22, 131-33; see also Strickland). 
Warren’s essay on the prose Alexander contains interesting reflections on prose form which 
may be relevant to Bodl. 264 thanks to the willed connection with Royal 19.D.1. 
